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Paul Tillich and Pitirim A. Sorokin on Love:
Dialogue between Science and Religion

FRAMING , FRAGMENTING, AND FREUD (?):
MODELS OF THE SELF AND FAITH
FORMATION
IN P AUL TILLICH AND IRIS MURDOCH
Jonathan Rothchild
Editor’s Note: Jonathan Rothchild of the University of Chicago received the Paul Tillich Prize for
the best paper submitted by a graduate student
at the annual banquet in Toronto in November
of 2002.
Consistently a thinker situated on the boundary,
Paul Tillich appropriates disparate symbolic resources to illuminate the inherent tension between
the fragmentary character of existence and the transcendental status of human essence. The purpose of
this essay is to probe two such resources, art and
psychoanalysis, which constitute self-reflexive models of the self. The objective of this analysis is to
gain critical purchase on Tillich’s diagnosis of the
self and its relevance to faith formation. Art and
psychoanalysis share affinities with Tillich’s method
of correlation and its interconnection between culture, morality, and religion. That is, in terms of Tillichian language of the spirit, art draws upon selfcreativity, but it also can induce the experience of
“ecstasy” and self-transcendence, while psychoanalysis lays bare the experience of “insight” or selfintegration. Pursuit of these inquiries will be enhanced by engagement of an interlocutor, philosopher Iris Murdoch and her magnum opus, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, for her notions of the
flawed self and moral transformation and her realist
retrieval of moral ontology resonate deeply with
Tillich’s sensibilities.
I argue that Tillich and Murdoch are unique
thinkers who, despite their divergence on significant
points (e.g., Good and good, work and grace, and
metaphysics and ontology),1 can redress general inadequacies of postmodern models of self and faith
formation—the dearth of self-critique, the reduction
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of ontological and metaphysical claims, the disavowal of consciousness and moral perception—because they reconfigure banal pictures of the
self into dynamic conceptions of humans as creative
and transcendent agents within culture, morality, and
religion.
The first section of the essay concentrates on the
import of art for self-understanding, the interrelation
between religion and culture, and the development
of faith and morals. Tillich and Murdoch contend
that the experiences of pictures and symbols function as sine qua non vehicles for accessing the
depths of the human condition. The importance of
symbols underscores the extent to which humans are
image-bearers and image-receptors who conceive of
themselves, others, and the world through visual
prisms. As Platonic realists of different sorts, Tillich
and Murdoch appreciate the allegory of the cave
(Republic, Book VII: 514-520d) as its metaphysical
pictures disclose the basic human mode of being in
the world: using efficacious metaphors and images
(Murdoch) and transcendent symbols (Tillich) to
picture the real and to do the good. Consequently,
art—both by embodying polyvalent structures of
form and by engendering the dissolution of
form—can reify the fragmentary condition and the
transformative capabilities of humanity as well as
disclose the metaphysical reality of others (Murdoch) and express ultimate concern (Tillich). The
principal difference between Murdoch and Tillich on
this point derives from Murdoch’s attention to literature as a normative source, which problematizes
Tillich’s preference for painting as the preferred artistic expression.
The second section considers another model
employed by Tillich, psychoanalysis. Tillich submits
that the conceptual tools of psychoanalysis “interpenetrate” the implicitly theological notions of estrangement, the centered-self, and healing. His insight gainsays overtures of the collapse of theology
after Freud; rather, psychoanalysis can marshal resources that facilitate—rather than the current perspective, that is, to deconstruct—the conceptualization of the self as flawed but redeemable and the
formation of faith as ultimate concern. The inclusion
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of Murdoch again becomes relevant because she attenuates the contribution of psychoanalysis; in her
judgment, it further perpetuates the illusions of the
relentless ego. The attitudes of Tillich and Murdoch
vis-à-vis psychoanalysis become perplexing when,
through the hermeneutical lens of Paul Ricoeur, one
notes the intrinsic relationship between reader and
text and analyst and analysand. The previous discussion of literature is thus reconceived in light of
questions raised by psychoanalysis pertaining to the
self and faith formation.
The conclusion attempts to synthesize these
points and to offer constructive proposals for contemporary visions of the self and the formation of
axiological concerns and moral convictions. Tillich
and Murdoch can contribute significantly to contemporary discussions of the self and faith formation
because—in contrast to thinkers who privilege narrative or the primordial claims of the other—they
mediate between the importance of theoretical transformative models and the relevance of the vicissitudes of the situation.
I. A Symbols and the Import of Art
Theologian James Mackey discusses the role of
art and its ramifications for humanity and reality.
Contending that postmodernity’s putative dualism
between mind and body—the perduring consequence of a corruption of Descartes’ philosophy exemplified in thinkers ranging from Hume and Kant,
Sartre and Levinas, and “the holy Trinity of postmodernism—Barthes, Foucault, and Derrida”2—results in the loss of the self and, concomitantly, the loss of reality. Mackey envisages art as a
means to re-conceptualize properly self and reality.
He argues, however, that appeal to art creates an interesting dilemma for students of the human condition. This appeal will “make at once too much and
too little of humanity” because, on the one hand, it
can focus too extensively on humanity and on “talk
of humanizing reality,” yet, on the other hand, it can
concentrate too exclusively on fragility and the
“permanent existential threatenedness” 3 that risks
vitiating the reality of humanity. Tillich, following
Plato and Schelling, remains acutely cognizant regarding the dangers of idolatry and the splendors of
expressive profundity of artistic images. As we will
soon discover, Tillich, like Murdoch, perceives the
necessity of art to render meaning for human creatures who are not bifurcated between mind and
body, but who are transcendent and yet fragmented
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and estranged from themselves, others, and the
world.
In his autobiography On the Boundary, Tillich
poignantly describes his first experiences of art during World War I: “I recall most vividly my first encounter—almost a revelation—with a Botticelli
painting in Berlin during my last furlough of the
war. Out of the philosophical and theological reflection that followed these experiences, I developed
some fundamental categories of philosophy of religion and culture, viz., form and substance.”4 These
existential encounters with art and the derived
structural categories permeate Tillich’s discussion of
the various dimensions of reality. Tillich writes in
The Courage to Be: “Modern art is not propaganda,
but revelation. It shows that the reality of our existence is as it is. It does not cover up the reality in
which we are living.”5 Art exposes levels of reality
in all their ontological, epistemological, and axiological complexities, and, as Tillich iterates
throughout his Systematic Theology, art may constitute revelation because it can grasp us as an absolute
and engender ultimate concern in a method similar
to genuine symbols. 6
The most apposite religious symbol for Tillich is
the picture of the New Being in Jesus Christ. Tillich
describes the transformative power of this image:
“through this picture the New Being has power to
transform those who are transformed by it. This implies that there is an analogia imaginis , namely, an
analogy between the picture and the actual personal
life from which it has arisen.” 7 This analogia imaginis underlies humanity’s encounter with and co nstrual of cultural symbols and invites participation in
these realities. Tillich’s examination of the relevance
of art remains consonant with his envisioned task of
a theonomous analysis of culture: “It is the task of
deciphering the style of an autonomous culture in all
its characteristic expressions and of finding their
hidden religious significance.”8
I. B. Tillich on Painting and Literature
Let us consider a specific example of a painting
embraced by Tillich for its “hidden religious significance” and its ability to express ultimate concern.
Commemorating the tragic bombing of a Spanish
town by Fascist forces, Pablo Picasso’s Guernica is
denominated by Tillich as “the best present-day
[1950s’] Protestant picture.”9 How can a secular entity be tantamount to a religious symbol? Tillich
isolates its style, or that which points to its self-
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interpretation and meaning, and states: “Picasso’s
Guernica is profoundly religious in this implicit
sense because it expresses so honestly and powerfully modern man’s anguished search for ultimate
meaning and his passionate revolt against cruelty
and hatred.” 10 Experimenting with abstract forms
that express the struggle to discover—albeit fragmentarily amid the chaos, horror, and violence of the
moment that is kairos—the meaningfulness of the
whole and ultimate concern, Picasso “wrought a
picture of seemingly extreme ugliness, but in actuality, a picture of great beauty.” 11 This picture of great
beauty is a cultural expression circumscribed in a
particular historical context; yet, its style discloses in
its extreme ugliness an unconditioned meaning that
asks ultimate questions, thereby transcending itself
and lying on the boundary between culture and religion. On this boundary, one encounters the ecstatic
experience that “does not destroy the structure of
reason” but drives reason “beyond the limits of its
finitude”12 to the presence of the ultimate.
Tillich’s dynamic boundary between culture and
religion, however, does disavow putatively religious
paintings, including Heinrich Hoffman’s Christ in
Gethsemane, that neither express this great beauty
nor communicate the depths of the human and ultimate concern. According to Tillich in his early essay
“On the Idea of a Theology of Culture,” such pictures are not truly religious because their ordinary
content (Inhalt) fails to “break through” to their
spiritual substance and religious import (Gehalt).13
These prosaic paintings reduce the profundity of images from one of ultimate concern that induces ecstatic awareness to a superficial portrayal that fails to
challenge the human fear of reality, to transform
radically ordinary reality, and to anticipate the new
possibilities of being.14 Manifested, for example, in
the work of Cézanne, van Gogh, and Munch, expressionism satisfies these shortcomings because, predicated on its novelty and sui generis style, it “breaks
away from the horizontal movement and shows the
Spiritual Presence in symbols of broken finitude.”15
Tillich is also captivated by the disclosive power
of other forms of art, including architecture. Tillich
increasingly becomes interested in architecture, including the notion of “sacred void” and the absence
of form. He envisions tremendous innovations in
religious architecture: “It is quite probable that the
renewal of religious art will start in co-operation
with architecture.”16 Yet, for purposes of this essay,
Tillich’s passion for literature is most pertinent. His
On the Boundary recounts his early, intense existen-
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tial identification with Hamlet as well as his sporadic, but impassioned reading of classical novels.
He then summarizes his rather confounding attitude
toward literature: “Literature, however, contained
too much philosophy to be able to satisfy fully the
desire for pure artistic contemplation. The discovery
of painting was a crucial experience for me.”17 To be
sure, Tillich appreciates the “artistic contemplation”
and power of literature,18 but he seems reticent to
affirm its self-transcendence as sanguinely as in the
genre of paintings. We will revisit this point below
in reference to Murdoch.
I. C. Murdoch on Art
Iris Murdoch also conceptualizes art as an integral feature and consequence of humans as “fantasizing imaginative animals” whose “[i]ntellect is
naturally one-making.”19 While she does value the
human imaginative capacities, Murdoch argues that
we humans are tyrannized by our fat, relentless
egos20 and that our fantasies dominate our performative modes of being in the world. She appropriates
the Platonic image of the cave to express our limited
and blemished capacities: “The mind is indeed besieged or crowded by selfish dream life. Plato used
the word eikasia, best translated here as ‘illusion’ or
‘fantasy,’ to indicate the most benighted human
state, the lowest condition in the Cave. He also uses
the word phantasia in this sense. He connects egoistic fantasy and lack of moral sense with inability to
reflect.”21 Solipsistic images, analogous to the flattened symbols repudiated by Tillich, simply reinforce this egoistic fantasy and perpetuate human
blindness vis-à-vis the moral Good and the concrete
reality of the other. Quite comfortable in the cave,
we humans are relegated to a restricted life of mimetic shadow-making and ethical self-obsession.
Nevertheless, Murdoch asserts that deep pictures
illumined by the Form provide clarifying images of
the real and the good that discipline the soul and
promote moral progress out of the cave. Analogous
to Tillich’s claim that genuine images and symbols
accommodate both moments of existence and the
ontological polarities, Murdoch synthesizes metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and ethics: “This is
metaphysics, which sets up a picture which it then
offers as an appeal to us all to see if we cannot find
just this in our deepest experience.”22 Pictures of the
good, often vouchsafed in what Murdoch calls “good
art,” penetrate the deepest recesses of human convictions about truth, love, and goodness. Hence,
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consistent with Tillich’s language of analogia
imaginis, Murdoch avers the necessity of art for the
moral life and faith formation: “Serious discussion
of states of consciousness, thinking, moral reflection, quality of being needs to use imagery and resort
to art.” 23 This “resort to art” is mandated by Murdoch’s retrieval of the import of the inner life, that
is, consciousness and imagination, for moral reflection. Tillich and Murdoch share a fundamental to art
as mediating the problematic nexus between existence and essence. Murdoch identifies art’s role in
ameliorating the dissonance: “We need more concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of
being; it is through an enriching and deepening of
concepts that moral progress takes place.”24
Murdoch grounds her claims for the importance
of art and the retrieval of consciousness and imagination on the basis of attention and attachments. Attention and attachments lie at the heart of her definition of morality: “Morality, as the ability or attempt
to be good, rests upon deep areas of sensibility and
creative imagination, upon removal from one state to
another, upon shift of attachments, upon love and
respect for the contingent details of the world.”25 As
mentioned above, Murdoch insists that natural human selfishness precludes suitable attention to the
other; however, through the artifices of paintings,
novels, and plays that induce spiritual discipline, art
can “break the ego, destroying the illusory whole of
the unified self.” 26 The broken individual thus shifts
his or her attention away from solipsistic images to
expansive pictures of the self, other, and world.
Sustained attention and lucid perception of truth effect—or at least facilitate the efficacy of—virtuous
action. Similar to Tillich’s conception of Picasso’s
Guernica as a liminal space that transforms ordinary
reality, Murdoch states:
Art illuminates accident and contingency and the
general muddle of life, the limitations of time
and the discursive intellect, so as to enable us to
survey complex or horrible things which would
otherwise appall us…Art makes places and
opens spaces for reflection, it is a defense
against materialism and against pseudoscientific attitudes of life. It calms and invigorates, it gives us energy by unifying, possibly by
purifying, our feelings. In enjoying great art we
experience a clarification and concentration and
perfection of our own consciousness.27
The key for both thinkers is not the content depicted, but rather the experience of “breaking
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through” expressed as ultimate concern or as protracted attention to the other.
Markedly similar to Tillich’s censure of pedestrian art that cannot invoke ultimate concern, Murdoch designates as “bad art” those images (e.g., television) that thwart self-reflection and self-criticism.
Murdoch extends her concept of bad art to include
consolation, which assuages the burden of moral
transformation. Murdoch’s incessant disquiet about
the spiritual journey compels her to nuance the benefit of even good art: “Even good art may make us
feel too much at ease with something less than the
best; it offers a sort of spiritual exercise and what
looks like a spiritual home, a kind of armchair sanctuary which may be a substitute for genuine moral
effort.”28 She worries in particular about the consoling effects of religious art that convey salvation and
grace. With some qualifications, Tillich appreciates
these concerns regarding complacency and consolation; his Protestant principle, expressed most robustly and trenchantly by the cross, provides an implicit
rejoinder to any definitive claims of the sacred in the
finite.29
Murdoch’s own work as a novelist raises intriguing questions about Tillich’s apparent resistance
to the significance of novels. A fortiori, Murdoch
appeals to a number of novelists (e.g., Proust, Henry
James, and Tolstoy) as interlocutors in various
chapters—including chapters not ostensibly dedicated to discussions on art—of her Metaphysics as a
Guide to Morals.30 This inclusion of novels in her
philosophical work signals her confidence that novels can illuminate our visions of goodness and truth.
Among myriad instantiations of this confidence,
Murdoch holds that novels “can give us a new vocabulary of experience, and a true picture of freedom,” and compel us to undertake a “focusing of
attention.”31 Murdoch upholds the “ordinariness” of
novels and their abilities to present to us these very
moments of ordinariness, not abstract speculations,
that help lay bare the dialectic between existence and
essence:
Characters in novels partake of the funniness
and absurdity and contingent incompleteness
and lack of dignity of people in ordinary life.
We read here both the positive being of individuals and also their lack of formal wholeness.
We are, as real people, unfinished and full of
blankness and jumble; only in our own illusioning fantasy are we complete. Good novels concern the fight between good and evil and the pil-
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grimage from appearance to reality. They expose
vanity and inculcate humility.32
Indeed, there are limits to the transcendence afforded by novels, which Murdoch herself notes. 33
Nevertheless, Tillich’s general characterization of
literature as containing “too much philosophy” appears overstated; he undervalues the capacity of
novels to depict life’s random happenings—which in
themselves have metaphysical implications—that
would help Tillich articulate the specific life-details
constituting the “situation.”34
I conclude the discussion of art by juxtaposing
two passages that provide, in my judgment, illuminating synopses of their views of the import of art.
Both passages discuss Rilke and describe art’s effects—effects that supersede the aesthetic, cognitive,
and moral realms and penetrate love, truth, and ultimate concern. First, listen to Murdoch’s explication
of genuine attention in art that undergirds her cognitivist moral particularism and her pursuit a correspondence theory of truth:
[Rainer Maria Rilke’s] remarks (all to Clara
Rilke) [about Cézanne] exhibit, in a way which
we may understand if we are acquainted with
any art or craft, what kind of achievement ‘pure
cognition’ or ‘perception without reverie’ might
be: to do with ‘animal attentiveness’, ‘good conscience,’ ‘only doing what you know,’ ‘simple
truthfulness,’ the ‘consuming love in anonymous
work.’35
Now, listen to Tillich’s analysis of art’s transformative effects on the whole person and the subject-object dynamic that are tantamount to a religious experience:
Art as such, whether liturgical or not, whether
dealing with religious subject matter or not,
penetrates, the subject-object reality in which we
are living; but whether it penetrates ultimate reality is another question. One of the criteria that
indicates something has been penetrated is that
the meaning of one’s total existence is involved,
not only one’s aesthetic existence. I remember a
poem by Rainer Maria Rilke in which he spoke
about a torso of an archaic Apollo and said that
whenever he looked at it, it said to him ‘Change
thy life.’ Now if this is experienced, the aesthetic experience is transformed; then the aesthetic has become a matter of ultimate concern
and that means a religious experience has occurred.36
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II. A. Psychoanalysis: Healing, Grace, and
Models of Encounter
Turning to another model of interpreting the
self, Tillich appreciates the import of psychoanalysis
for understanding the formation of the self and its
concomitant faith formation. Tillich’s own work influenced psychologists, including Rollo May, Karen
Horney, Erich Fromm, and Erik Erikson. As illustrated in his Systematic Theology, The Courage to
Be, and Theology of Culture, Tillich contends that
psychoanalysis, like art, helps elucidate the relationships between self and world and the ontological
polarities: “The recovery of the meaning of anxiety
through the combined endeavors of existential philosophy, depth psychology, neurology, and the arts
is one of the achievements of the twentieth century.”37 These related disciplines are valuable because they help enrich Tillich’s language of “estrangement,” “abyss,” “eros,” and “reunion” and
clarify the distinctions between fear and anxiety.
Furthermore, Tillich submits that psychoanalysis
can disabuse theologians of notions that the functions of the spirit can operate efficaciously without a
critical recognition of the complexity of human nature.38 Influenced by Schelling and Jacob Böhme,
Tillich posits that the constitutive parts of this nature
include a demonic element, which psychoanalytic
research helped reintroduce into general discourse.
Tillich applauds this fact because “wherever the demonic appears there the question as to its correlate,
the divine, will also be raised.” 39 Psychoanalysis
then, despite its general trajectory against the legitimacy of religious beliefs and practices, actually
stimulates discussion of these beliefs and practices
when it expatiates on the demonic element within
the human. Thus, for these reasons, psychoanalysis
provides Tillich with another bridge to navigate
between the existential vicissitudes of life and the
essential character of ontological structure.
This bridge usually appears in the form of accrued knowledge of the self. Tillich appropriates the
model of knowledge as “insight” or “gnosis.” This
insight facilitates self-integration through selftransformation and reunion:
Recently the term ‘insight’ has been given connotations of gnosis, namely, of a knowledge
which transforms and heals. Depth psychology
attributes healing powers to insight, meaning not
a detached knowledge of psychoanalytic theory
or of one’s own past in the light of this theory
but a repetition of one’s actual experiences with
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all the pains and horrors of such a return. Insight
in this sense is a reunion with one’s own
past…Such a cognitive union produces a transformation just as radical and as difficult as that
presupposed and demanded by Socrates and
Paul.40
This insight, the “reunion with one’s past,” effects a “radical” transformation because it functions
similarly as forgiveness through love: it heals
through the “drive towards the unity of the separated.” 41 Yet, Tillich distinguishes the disparate natures of these healing encounters so that we comprehend the limited and specific healing within psychotherapy. The “acceptance of the unacceptable”
secured through agape exists on an ontological level,
whereas any denouement through therapy exists on a
cognitive and emotional level: “There are striking
analogies between the recent methods of mental
healing and the traditional ways of personal salvation. But there is also one basic difference. Psychotherapy can liberate one from a special difficulty.
Religion shows to him who is liberated, and has to
decide about the meaning and aim of his existence, a
final way. This difference is decisive for the independence as well as for the co-operation of religion
and psychotherapy.”42 Psychotherapy can disclose to
an individual the motivation behind and the meaning
of his/her actions, and thus help clarify his/her mode
in the existential realm of being; religion, however,
can disclose the “final” meaning of the interrelation
between the existential and essential realms of being.
Tillich further probes this interpenetration between psychoanalysis and religion in the notion of
awareness of the distance between essence and existence; thus, existentialism enters the picture.
Similar to his reconciliation between ontology and
Biblical religion in Biblical Religion and the Search
for Ultimate Reality, Tillich contends that the Biblical religion and psychoanalysis share similar conceptions of existential awareness: “The principle of
awareness is related to contemporary depth psychology, but it is as old as religion itself and is sharply
expressed in the New Testament. It is the principle
according to which man in the process of sanctification becomes increasingly aware of his actual situation and of the forces struggling around him and his
humanity but also becomes aware of the answers to
the questions implied in this situation. Sanctification
includes awareness of the demonic as well as of the
divine.”43 This awareness of the demonic and divine
vis-à-vis the actual situation reiterates Tillich’s claim
about the affinities between existentialism and psy-
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choanalysis. Despite the counterclaims of other
thinkers, Tillich argues at length that existentialism
and psychoanalysis possess similar sensibilities and
have mutually influenced one another in their common exploration of human estranged existence.44
The notion of mutual influence between existentialism and psychoanalysis, at first blush, seems
easily problematized: to what extent can the radical
freedom of existentialism be reconciled with the
seeming determinism endemic to psychoanalysis?
Tillich believes that such reconciliation is rendered
possible because both identify questions arising
from human existence. Consequently, existentialism
and psychoanalysis merely describe the human
situation and ask questions of it without providing
the definitive answers. These questions function as
critical guides for understanding existence, but they
must be correlated with the answers afforded by the
ontological dimension of religious faith. Hence, Tillich affirms that it is “[o]nly in the light of an ontological understanding of human nature can the body
of material provided by psychology and sociology
be organized into a consistent and comprehensive
theory of anxiety.”45 This collaborative effort encapsulates the limited, but important contribution of
psychoanalysis for understanding the self.
II. B. Murdoch and Psychoanalysis
While she asserts that she is “not a ‘Freudian,’”
Murdoch avows the truth of Freudian theory vis-àvis its construal of “the psyche as an egocentric system of quasi-mechanical energy, largely determined
by its own individual history, whose natural attachments are sexual, ambiguous, and hard for the subject to understand or control. Introspection reveals
only the deep tissue of ambivalent motive, and fantasy is a stronger force than reason. Objectivity and
unselfishness are not natural to human beings.”46
Murdoch, influenced by Plato’s Timaeus and
Freud’s theory of ubiquitous libidinal energy, advocates that the moral life consists of shifting attachments and harnessing energy. Hence, one would deduce that Murdoch would have affinities with psychoanalysis in that she intends to marshal forces to
mitigate this natural selfishness.
However, Murdoch admonishes her readers
about the consoling perils of psychoanalysis that
imply facile answers to complex phenomena. For
example, psychoanalysis promotes efforts to retrieve
the self through personal narration and mimetic roleplaying. Murdoch recognizes the intent of such
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practices, but she cautions: “We want to control the
tale ourselves and give it our ending (which need not
of course be in the ordinary sense a happy one). We
want to make a move to a conclusion, our conclusion.”47 Hence, Murdoch submits that psychoanalysis optimistically over-determines the transformative
powers of certain cognitive and volitional exercises
that, as in the writings of the existentialists,48 simply
reinforce egoism; she contends that the relentless
ego will not relinquish its reign through exercises
focusing on the self. Murdoch maintains that the ego
must be displaced, even “shocked,” through concrete
attention to the other impelled by images of the
Good.49 Here we can observe a significant divergence between Murdoch and Tillich: while both seek
to protect, but ultimately transform the individual,
only Tillich embraces the strategies of existentialism
and psychoanalysis as plausible means to accomplish this goal (even if in the limited manner as explained in the above discussion).
Moreover, Murdoch castigates psychoanalysis’s
reductive tendencies to explain away idiosyncratic
character traits such as sense of humor with technical jargon and deterministic categorization. She declares: “Psychoanalysis is a muddled embryonic science, and even if it were not, there is no argument
that I know of that can show us that we have got to
treat its concepts as fundamental. The notion of an
‘ideal analysis’ is a misleading one.”50 Another impetus for her scrutiny and dismissal of psychoanalysis derives from its historical bifurcation of fact and
value. The systematic subsuming of the inner life of
consciousness, convictions, and desires into mechanical compartmentalizations objectifies experience and divests it of its definitively subjective and
individual character. Murdoch contends that the
paramount problem of the self is and always will be
the self, regardless of the scientifically derived
causal explanations. She shares this concern with
Tillich, for he too censures psychoanalysis’s tendency to reduce the complexity of the human condition—even if it is merely finite freedom—and to
disavow the fundamental importance of human brokenness and human transcendence. He writes in the
third volume of his Systematic Theology:
Today psychotherapy (including all schools of
psychological healing) often tries to eliminate
both medical healing and the healing function of
the Spiritual Presence. The first is usually a
matter of practice rather than theory, the second
mostly a matter of principle. The psychoanalyst,
for example, claims that he can overcome the
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negativities of man’s existential situation—anxiety, guilt, despair, emptiness, and so
on. But in order to support his claim the analyst
must deny both the existential estrangement of
man from himself and the possibility of his transcendent reunion with himself; that is, he must
deny the vertical line in man’s encounter with
reality.51
Let us conclude this section by re-examining the
earlier discussion of literature through the lens of the
current treatment of psychoanalysis. Philosopher
Paul Ricoeur, among others, has argued convincingly that reader and text presents a good analogue
for understanding the relationship between analyst
and analysand.52 With minor variations, both models
consist of actors and patients whose roles are interchangeable and mutually interpreted; both have objectives as the construction of coherent stories
whereby, through the course of narrative, intelligibility of structures and constancy of self are attained.
If this analogy holds true, it seems reasonable to assert that Tillich’s subordination of literature and
Murdoch’s dismissal of psychoanalysis are untenable. These positions are untenable because they are
inconsistent with the internal principles of their own
systems.
III. Concluding Reflections
Our discussion of Tillich and Murdoch has traversed two foci within the matrix of culture, morality,
and religion to demonstrate the depth and scope of
their writings. Our principally synthetic method
noted numerous similarities, and one should not
overlook the rather stark analytic differences that
distinguish these two interlocutors. Alas, these distinctions will have to be parsed on another occasion;
the task of this conclusion is to sharpen the contribution of Murdoch and Tillich to contemporary discussions about the self and post-modern faith formation. These discussions of post-modern faith formation can be incredibly stimulating, but they can
also collapse into various extremes that deserve brief
mention. On the one hand, the retreat from a divisive
world to religious narratives as the exclusive criterion for truth and goodness lacks awareness of the
overall spiritual situation and fails to critique itself
self-reflexively. On the other hand, the submission
to the primordial claims of the other prevents the
transcendental affirmation of one’s own being as
part of a more significant ontological meaning. 53
Through his analyses of art and psychoanalysis, Til-
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lich transcends the narrow parameters of reductive
claims to bring forth the essence of self, other, and
morality: “True morality is a morality of risk. It is
morality which is based on the ‘courage to be,’ the
dynamic self-affirmation of man as man. This selfaffirmation must take the threat of non-being, death,
guilt, and meaninglessness into itself. It risks itself,
and through the courage of risking itself, it wins itself. Moralisms give safety, morality lives in the unsafety of risk and courage.” 54 This risk, similar to
Murdoch’s method of metaphysical pictures coupled
with attention to others and the contingencies of life,
reflects a realistic awareness of the tensions created
in every moment between existential vicissitudes
and essential structure. Murdoch and Tillich utilize
various symbolic resources to complicate and intensify this awareness; they recognize that their methods must be capacious so as to attend properly to the
profundity and complexity of the human condition.
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Space precludes in-depth analysis and comparison
of these principal themes. Rather, I emphasize the extent
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to which their views of art and psychoanalysis signal distinct presuppositions about the self and its relation to
other and to reality. I engage other postmodern thinkers
by way of discussions in the footnotes.
2
The Critique of Theological Reason, 91.
3
Ibid., 226. Mackey’s principal retrieval of self and
reality derives from a comprehensive metaphysics that
has affinities with the Judeo-Christian conception of
creation. For further comments on Mackey’s book, please
see my forthcoming review in The Journal of Religion.
4
On the Boundary, 28.
5
The Courage to Be, 147.
6
For Tillich, symbols function as the organic means
by which humans can conceptualize their estranged condition and ultimate reality. Symbols, an extension of the
resonance between ontology and epistemology, point beyond themselves toward ultimate concern. On symbols,
please see, inter alia, Dynamics of Faith.
7
Systematic Theology, Volume 2, 114-115.
8
“Religion and Secular Culture,” in The Protestant
Era, 58.
9
“Existential Aspects of Modern Art,” in On Art and
Architecture, ed. by John Dillenberger, 95. Please see also
“Protestantism and Artistic Style,” in Theology of Culture, 68-75.
10
“Authentic Religious Art,” in On Art and Architecture, 232.
11
“The Demonic in Art,” in On Art and Architecture,
110. In “Protestantism and Artistic Style,” 73, Tillich
writes: “The ultimate is also present in those experiences
of reality in which its negative, ugly, and self-destructive
side is encountered.” This juxtaposition between the ultimate and ugliness parallels, to some extent, the perspectives of Julia Kristeva, Georges Bataille, and Jacques Lacan on the ambiguity (and even filth) of the sacred.
12
Dynamics of Faith, 76; Ibid., 77.
13
In The Religious Situation, 55, Tillich clarifies this
distinction in reference to such paintings: “nowhere does
one break through to the eternal, to the unconditioned
content of reality which lies beyond the antithesis of subject and object.” In Ibid., 57, he also notes a comparison
similar to the above: “It is not an exaggeration to ascribe
more of the quality of sacredness to a still-life by Cézanne
or a tree by van Gogh than to a picture of Jesus by Uhde.”
14
“Art and Society,” in On Art and Architecture, 18;
“Protestantism and Artistic Style,” 74; and “Art and Ultimate Reality” (1960), Main Works, Vol. 2, Writings in the
Philosophy of Culture, 317-332.
15
Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 258. Autonomous
and heteronomous art, by contrast, cannot recognize this
same genuine revelation; according to Michael Palmer,
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these styles are “forms of literalism” where “[n]either can
speak of revelation as the unconditioned import of meaning ‘breaking through’ the form of meaning” (Paul Tillich’s Philosophy of Art, 156 [original emphasis]; 156).
16
“Protestantism and Artistic Style,” 75.
17
On the Boundary, 27.
18
For example, he does conjecture that “the influence
of literature on the religious situation of a period, by virtue of the superiority of words over lines and colors, is
both more direct and more general than is the influence of
art” (The Religious Situation, 62).
19
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 323; Ibid., 1.
20
In “On ‘God’ and ‘Good,’” in Existentialists and
Mystics, 342, Murdoch declares that “[i]n the moral life
the enemy is the fat relentless ego.”
21
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 317. Murdoch
does not adhere to all of Plato’s teaching. She problematizes his “puritan” view toward art, and she redresses his
abstract application of eros merely to ideas by advocating
for the centrality of concrete attention of the other. For
Tillich’s discussion of the cave allegory and its relation to
theonomy, please see, inter alia, “Religion and Secular
Culture” in The Protestant Era, 63.
22
Ibid., 507.
23
Ibid., 305.
24
“Against Dryness,” in Existentialists and Mystics,
293.
25
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 337.
26
Ibid., 104. This destruction of the fallacious self is
subsumed within the spiritual journey. Murdoch, “The
Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited,” in Existentialists
and Mystics, 282, writes: “But one’s theory of art must
account for the fact that experience of art is spiritual experience.”
27
Ibid., 8. The resonance between Tillich’s Guernica
and Murdoch’s views become more apparent when Murdoch suggests: “The endlessly various formal separateness of art makes spaces for reflection. To resume: art
cannot help, whatever its subject, beautifying and consoling. Goya’s ‘horrors of war’ are terrifying but beautiful” (Ibid., 122; my emphasis).
28
Ibid., 91.
29
To be sure, Murdoch and Tillich differ on the extent to which “genuine moral effort” by itself can facilitate moral transformation. Nevertheless, it is interesting
that both thinkers observe a tension within images that
encapsulate the inherent ambiguity within culture, morality, and religion.
30
One of the ways to navigate Murdoch’s rather
amorphous text is based on a structural schema: chapters
1-5 discuss image-making, appearances, and art, chapters
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6-12 address consciousness and the inner life, and chapters 13-19 contemplate transcendent reality.
31
“Against Dryness,” 295, and “The Novelist as
Metaphysician,” in Ibid., 107.
32
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 97
33
This derives, in part, from her adherence, pace
Derrida, to Plato’s concerns about writing and the usurpation of consciousness by the contemporary turn to language. Writing for Murdoch does not function as the divine, say, as it does for Julia Kristeva, who views literature as “taking the place of the sacred” “because it hence
decks itself out in the sacred power of horror” (Powers of
Horror: An Essay on Abjection, 208;\ 208).
34
Tillich, in the introduction to his The Religious
Situation 12, defines situation as an “unconscious faith
which is not assailed because it is the presupposition of
life and is lived rather than thought of, this alldetermining, final source of meaning constitutes the actual religious situation of a period” (my emphasis).
35
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 247.
36
“The Demonic in Art,” 116.
37
Systematic Theology, Volume 1, 191.
38
Systematic Theology, Volume III, 240.
39
The Religious Situation, 32. See also “The Theological Significance of Existentialism and Psychoanalysis,” in Theology of Culture, 123.
40
Systematic Theology, Volume I, 96.
41
Love, Power, and Justice, 25.
42
“Moralisms and Morality: Theonomous Ethics,” in
Theology of Culture, 143.
43
Systematic Theology, Volume III, 231.
44
Philip Rieff, in his Freud: The Mind of the Moralist, 96, argues: “Psychoanalysis—at least programmatically—does not aim at achieving a more critical view of
the self, as does existentialism, for example, which has
sponsored a heightened introspection in order to validate a
more negative and critical view of both self and world.
Rather psychoanalysis seeks to ease the burden of responsibility and engagement.” For Tillich’s argument to the
contrary, please see his “The Theological Significance of
Existentialism and Psychoanalysis” in Theology of Culture, 112-126.
45
The Courage to Be, 65.
46
Murdoch, “On ‘God’ and ‘Good,’” 341. 341 Inter
alia, Murdoch makes passing references to “our natural
sloth, our weariness and covert despair” (Metaphysics as
a Guide to Morals, 479).
47
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 105 (original
emphasis).
48
Murdoch eschews the existentialists’ focus on
radical freedom, the volitional capacities of the will, and
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leaps between stages of existence. For Murdoch’s fulllength treatment of existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, please
see her Sartre: Romantic Rationalist.
49
Murdoch does not conceive of psychoanalysis as a
form of critique of the ego, which is advocated by thinkers such as Jacques Lacan. Murdoch interestingly does
not engage Lacan, most likely because he employs conceptual tools from structuralists and post-structuralists
that Murdoch abrogates as obviating consciousness and
ordinary truth. She therefore would not accept Lacan’s
(Lévi-Straussian influenced) notion that “the unconscious
is structure like a language” (The Four Fundamental
Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, 20; original emphasis). Lacan’s emphasis on language is further illustrated through
the development of conceptual models to depict alienation: “This alienating or is not an arbitrary invention, nor
is it a matter of how one sees things. It is a part of language itself” (Ibid., 212 original emphasis). This linguistically informed model conflicts sharply with Murdoch’s
link between vision, epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. One can point to a certain resonance concerning Murdoch’s image of shocking the ego and Lacan’s pursuit of
the real via the other. However, I submit that Lacan’s notions of “the split, of the stroke, of rupture” (Ibid., 26),
analogous to Georges Bataille’s language of sacrifice,
differ from Murdoch’s views because they pertain to a
radical heterogeneity that while real, is unknowable. By
contrast, Murdoch envisions the shock as a shift of conscious attachment from self-obsession to disciplined attention to the other as metaphysically and concretely real:
self and other still exist, but as an attenuated self in a different relation to the other. For Murdoch’s account, please
see her “M and D” example in “The Idea of Perfection,”
in Existentialists and Mystics, 312-318, where, contra the
behaviorists, she describes the vacillations and moral progression of a mother’s consciousness vis-à-vis her
daughter-in-law. I may also note in passing that Tillich
would disagree with Lacan’s notions that the unconscious
is “pre-ontological” as it is “neither being, nor non-being,
but the unrealized” (Ibid., 29 original emphasis; 30).
50
“The Idea of Perfection,” 320.
51
Systematic Theology, Volume III, 281.
52
On this point, please see Ricoeur’s “What is a
Text? Explanation and Understanding?” in Hermeneutics
and the Human Sciences, 268, Time and Narrative, Volume 3, 247, and Freud and Philosophy, 474. The comparison is not perfect, and Ricoeur does note subtle differences.
53
I have noted similarities and differences between
Murdoch and Tillich and several post-modern thinkers
who privilege the other. To be sure, both Murdoch and
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Tillich recognize the claims of the other, but these claims
are always interpreted within larger structures of meaning
(e.g. Tillich’s formulation of the ontological polarities
including individuation and participation, his construal of
self and world as the basic ontological structure, and his
notion of reunion through agape and Murdoch’s contention that the magnetic impulses of the Good illuminate the
goodness of individual beings and compel concrete attention to the other). They do not exclude notions of embodiment or affectivity, but these formulations differ, say,
from Emmanuel Levinas’s lordship of the other (with the

self as hostage) or Kristeva’s presentation of the abject as
“the jettisoned object, [which] is radically excluded and
draws me toward the place where meaning collapses”
(Powers of Horror: An Essay in Abjection, 2). Murdoch
and Tillich propose that the meanings of self, other, and
world cohere in moments that, while fragmentary, provide
glimpses of the underlying meaning of being (ontology)
and goodness (metaphysics) where a residual element of
self remains.
54
“Moralisms and Morality: Theonomous Ethics,”
141.

HOW DOES THE LETTER KILL?
THE TILLICHIAN AND LUTHERAN
UNDERSTANDINGS OF LAW

principle, has allowed the law to have a positive significance for human beings—both for those who are
“old beings,” living under sin, and those who are
reborn. By contrast, Tillich makes little allowance
for a positive use of law. Under the conditions of
actual existence, the law only oppresses. Under the
Spiritual Presence, human beings are increasingly
free from the law; in fact, the law disappears. Tillich
does permit a theological use of the law, but his understanding of the law’s convicting and unmasking
power is much weaker than that of Lutheran theology.
The purpose of this paper is to examine Tillich’s
theology of law in light of a standard Lutheran view.
For this “standard Lutheran view,” I rely on the
Book of Concord, the collection of confessional
documents Lutherans accept as normative. I begin
by observing how and why Lutherans view law as a
fundamental good for human beings. I then explore
Tillich’s position, comparing and contrasting it with
the Lutheran model. Finally, I conclude with some
reflections the core theological and anthropological
assumptions at stake in the debate.
Before beginning, however, I would like to say a
word about why I am undertaking this topic at the
present time. A debate currently rages among Lutheran theologians about theology of law and the
relationship between law and Christian freedom. 2
Within this debate, David Yeago and Reinhard Hütter portray Tillich (along with other post-Kantian
Lutheran thinkers) as a modern antinomian. As I will
show in this essay, this claim has some basis. I am
less certain whether Lutherans should adopt Yeago
and Hütter’s proposed solution to this antinomian
trend, a solution that draws in part upon character
and virtue ethics and the recovery of Aristotle and
Thomas Aquinas. In my estimation, it is worth ask-

Kimberly R. Miller
Editor’s Note: This is the Newsletter’s annual
student paper. Kimberly R. Miller is a student at
Yale Divinity School. This paper, written for a
course taught by Professor David Kelsey, was
chosen by Professor Kelsey as the most outstanding in his class. The editor is grateful to
Professor Kelsey for his selection of this paper
for the Newsletter.
In an autobiographical essay, Paul Tillich wrote,
“I, myself, belong to Lutheranism by birth, education, religious experience, and theological reflection.
I have never stood on the borders of Lutheranism
and Calvinism. The substance of my religion is and
remains Lutheran.”1 Although Tillich was by no
means a confessional Lutheran theologian, he incorporated many Lutheran themes in the development
of his constructive position, including justification
by faith, the two kingdoms, and the sola gratia principle. Tillich also translates the traditional Lutheran
claim that the law neither saves nor justifies: it neither reunites our essential with our actual being nor
gives us unambiguous life. Only by being accepted—only by grace—do human beings receive
unambiguous life. On first glance, then, Tillich’s
theology of law seems quite Lutheran in substance.
A closer examination of Tillich’s view of law,
however, suggests that assessing its Lutheran character is more complicated. Traditional Lutheran theology, while maintaining the sola gratia

